ESEP prepress abstract   -  DOI: https://doi.org/10.3354/esep00219

ABSTRACT: This article aims to analyze Hans Jonas's perspective on the rights of animals to life. We will show how, according to Jonas, the ethical significance of animals emerges as they reveal nature's vulnerability and underscore the moral duty of humans, whose responsibility intensifies as their capacity to cause harm increases. Within this framework, it is essential to recognize that [1] Jonas supports the criterion of maximum benefit when it comes to animal experimentation for scientific purposes; [2] his theory reflects a concern for the conditions of animals within the meat industry, advocating for moderation in consumption; [3] his ethical approach is particularly focused on the protection of endangered animal species, a concern that has become increasingly urgent with the rise of modern technological powers. For Jonas, an ethical theory that seeks to address the challenge of species preservation must begin with a theoretical redefinition that acknowledges animals as “ends in themselves,” a shift that would necessitate a reevaluation not only of ethics but also of the underlying ontological and metaphysical assumptions. Finally, as we will discuss, Jonas's ongoing debate on the rights of animals to life brings to the forefront the central concern of his ethics of responsibility: maintaining the balance of the cosmic whole against the destructive impact of human activity, which has led to the extinction of animal species with which humans share a “solidarity of interests.” It is within this context that Jonas's stance on animal rights should be understood, and it is precisely here that his position stands out as both innovative and urgent in the defense of animal life.